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 Abstract 
 
This essay explores the refugee’s access to human rights in regard to the case of Hirsi 
Jamaa and others v. Italy. The status of refugee, official or not, entails certain rights and 
state obligation, but the correlation between refugee rights and human rights is 
problematic. The analysis of the case parties’ arguments for and against violation of 
relevant articles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, shows how the parties define concepts crucial to the concept of 
refugee. The comparison of the summarized results with theories relating to the refugee 
conception and humanhood, conjures an image of the refugee as less than human, lacking 
a political voice, and in extension unable to enjoy human rights to the full. 
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Denna uppsats utforskar flyktingens tillgång till mänskliga rättigheter när det gäller fallet 
med Hirsi Jamaa m.fl. mot Italien. Flyktingstatus, officiell eller inte, medför vissa 
rättigheter och statsskyldighet, men sambandet mellan flyktingars rättigheter och 
mänskliga rättigheter är problematisk. Den analys av parternas argument för och mot 
kränkning av relevanta artiklar i Europeiska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga 
rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna, visar hur parterna definierar begrepp som 
är avgörande för begreppet flykting. Jämförelsen av de sammanfattade resultaten med 
teorier som rör uppfattningen av flykting och mänsklighet, frammanar en bild av 
flyktingen som mindre än mänskliga, som saknar en politisk röst, och i förlängningen inte 
kan åtnjuta de mänskliga rättigheterna till fullo. 
 
Nyckelord: flyktingar - mänskliga rättigheter - Hirsi Jamaa m.fl. mot Italien - push-back 
- asyl - non-refoulement - territoriell jurisdiktion – säkert tredjeland
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1 Introduction 
”We are all refugees of a future that never happened.”1 But what if that future was the 
present? 
 The interception of refugees from Somalia and Eritrea on the high seas off the 
coast of Italy in 2009, as well as the push-back and return to Libya has called into 
question what the definition of a refugee is, and what the relation between refugee rights 
and human rights is. 
 The driving force for picking the case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy2 as my 
primary material was inspired by an article3 I read addressing the bilateral agreement 
between Libya and Italy4 , allowing the push back of refugees intercepted by Italian 
military on the high seas off the coast of Italy. The court case was processed by the 
European Court of Human Rights, following an application lodged by Somali and 
Eritrean refugees against the Italian Republic. My research in to the matter led me to the 
case in question and it sparked an interest in the perception and definition of the concept 
and term refugee. In addition, the reading of the material resulted in questioning if the 
concept of refugee in theory as well as in reality enables refugees to enjoy human rights 
to the full. 
The application was lodged under article 34 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms5 (the Convention), stating: 
 
“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set 
forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in 
any way the effective exercise of this right.” 
 
                                                
1 Lee Weiner, in: Mc Call, Cheryl, Their Anger Behind Them, the Chicago 7 Declare Peace in the '70s, 
2 Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (Application no. 27765/09) 
3 Kreickenbaum, Martin, Italy carries out mass deportation of refugees, World Socialist Web Site, 9 
October 2004, retrieved 23 December 2012,http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2004/10/ital-o09.html 
4 Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, pp. 5-6 
5 European Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950 
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The situation, referred to in the application and the case, took place on May 6, 2009. 
Eleven Somali and thirteen Eritrean nationals, part of a group of approximately 200 
migrants, departed from Libya in boats, with the purpose of reaching the coast of Italy. 
Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard intercepted the boats within the search and rescue 
zone of Malta. The migrants were transferred onto the Italian military ships and claim 
that they were stripped of their personal effects including identification documents. 
Without being informed of the intent, they were returned to Tripoli and handed over to 
the Libyan authorities despite objecting to the transfer. The applicants state that the 
Italian authorities made no attempt either to identify them or evaluate their claim for 
international protection and asylum. 
The day after the interception, May 7, the Italian Minister of the Interior stated 
that the action was a consequence of the bilateral agreements with Libya that came into 
force February 4, 2009, on interception and push-back of migrants on the high seas. He 
described it as a turning point in the fight against clandestine immigration6. 
In the case the applicants argue that the action violated Article 3 of the 
Convention, ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’, as well as Article 4 of Protocol No 47, ‘Collective expulsion of aliens is 
prohibited’. They also criticize the lack of remedy in relation to Article 13 of the 
Convention: 
 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting 
in an official capacity.” 
 
 The case shows how crucial it is to be viewed and treated as a person before the 
law. The negligence of an identification process has proved to be a violation of all human 
rights, as the lack of this process leads to the denial of personhood and the status of being 
a human being. 
 
                                                
6 Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, pp. 3-4 
7 Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the first 
Protocol thereto - [1963] COETS 4 (16 September 1963) 
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1.1 Purpose, Problem Statement and Question Formulation 
The purpose of this essay has been to explore the case applicants’, Italy’s, and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ definition of the concept refugee and to what extent 
their definitions correlate with human rights. I have seen a problem in what actual rights 
and obligations that derive from the process of defining a refugee. 
The execution has entailed a concept analysis of the three parties’ definitions of a 
series of concepts relating to the status of refugees. These concepts are: asylum, non-
refoulement, jurisdiction and territory, and safe (third) country. In addition I have 
performed a theoretical analysis of the summarized result of the concept analysis. This 
has assisted me in answering the questions I have posed to my primary material.  
I question if the concept refugee is an applicable qualification for attaining the 
status of human rights bearer and/or if the collective belief of the status of refugee gives 
someone the function of human rights holder. To answer this question I have asked 
subsequent questions: 
• How do the applicants, the Italian Government, and the European Court of 
Human Rights define the concepts asylum, non-refoulement, territory and 
jurisdiction, and safe (third) country? 
• What are the differences between the three parties’ definitions? 
• Do the three parties’ definitions result in the appreciation of the applicants as 
refugees? 
• How does the status of refugee correlate to human rights? 
1.2 Material 
The primary material of this essay is the case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy. The case 
cites the Somali and Eritrean applicants’ (the Applicants) and Italy’s (the Government) 
arguments in relation to the situation described above. In addition, the European Court of 
Human Rights (the Court) received written observations by third party actors8. The case 
also presents legal documents, such as previous cases, international and European law, 
Italian domestic law, as well as various conventions and reports. Furthermore, the case 
                                                
8 Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, p. 2 
 4 
presents the Court’s perspective on the merits and application of laws regarding the 
claims of violations and results in the Court’s verdict, a judgment in favor of the 
Applicants. 
The primary material allowed me to examine the Applicants’, the Government’s 
and the Court’s definitions of the concept refugee. Furthermore it presented a situation 
where the definition of the concept refugee is central to the rights of refugees, which gave 
me the opportunity to analyze what those rights entail in connection to human rights.  
I want to emphasize how significant the book The Refugee in International Law9 
has been for my research and understanding regarding the different concepts I have 
analyzed. The legal definitions presented in The Refugee in International Law have 
helped me to distinguish the parties’ perspectives concerning the concepts – and in 
extension their perception of refugee – and human and refugee rights. 
1.3 Restrictions 
I have chosen to dismiss previous cases that are mentioned in the case, as not significant 
to the purpose of this essay. The Court summarizes and evaluates the contributions by 
third party actors and previous court cases and has used them to assess the Applicants’ 
and the Government’s arguments. Therefore I have chosen not to include the arguments 
of third parties or previous court cases. I have focused on the Applicants’, the 
Government’s and the Court’s arguments, relating to violations of article 3 and 13 of the 
Convention and article 4 of Protocol 4, because I believe them to be relevant to the 
analysis of the three parties’ definitions of the different concepts. 
 Furthermore I have disregarded the document of Italy’s reply on the lists of issues 
raised by the U.N. Human Rights Committee during its 85th session in 2005. The 
Committee asks Italy for comments on the reports of Italy’s interception and expulsion in 
circumstances precluding the examination of applications for asylum. Italy’s reply does 
not contain any comments on or answers to the questions raised.  
 In regard to the articles presented in related research I have chosen not to use 
them, as they focus on the de facto and de jure application of international law and 
                                                
9 Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. & McAdam, Jane, The refugee in international law, 3. ed., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007 
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Convention articles. They are therefore not of use, as I approach the material from a 
theoretical perspective. I will not examine the concept of collective expulsion, as I 
believe the concepts presented below will suffice for the purpose of this essay. 
1.4 Related research 
In the article Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus 
Extraterritorial Migration Control? 10 , Violeta Moreno-Lax examines the legal 
implications presented in the case. By doing so she highlights the development and the 
impact the Court’s ruling might have on the extraterritorial obligation of states. She 
points out that the case and ruling should “lead to a radical change in the way migration 
and border controls have been designed and implemented so far – both at the national and 
supranational levels”11. 
 Mariagiulia Giuffrés article Watered-down Rights on the High Seas: HIRSI 
JAMAA AND OTHERS V ITALY (2012) 12 focuses on the “extraterritorial interpretation 
of the legal notion of ‘jurisdiction’”13 and “the level of protection owed to refugees 
intercepted on the high seas and returned to third countries without an assessment of their 
protection claims”14. She concludes by pointing out the human rights obligations that 
arise out of an extraterritorial exertion of authority. The result is that countries are 
obliged to conduct themselves according to the national human rights standards inside as 
well as outside their borders when they practice an authoritative control over individuals. 
2 Method and Theory 
2.1 Method 
I have looked at the legal definitions of concepts that I believe are important to refugee 
status and refugee rights in relation to my primary material. By presenting the legal 
definitions, with the help of the book The Refugee in International Law, I have informed 
                                                
10 Moreno-Lax, Violeta, 'Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus Extraterritorial 
Migration Control?', Human Rights Law Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 2012, pp. 574-598 
11 Moreno-Lax, p. 598 
12 Giuffré, Mariagiulia , 'Watered-down Rights on the High Seas: HIRSI JAMAA AND OTHERS V 
ITALY (2012)’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 3, 2012, pp. 728-750 
13 Giuffré, p. 731 
14 Giuffré, p. 731 
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the reader of a legal definition of each concept and laid a base for the examination of the 
Applicants’, the Government’s and the Court’s definitions of the concepts. By analyzing 
the three actors’ arguments relating to the proposed violations of article 3 and 13 of the 
Convention and article 4 of Protocol 4, I have been able to summarize and interpret their 
perception of the concepts in question and in conclusion assess their conception of what it 
entails to be a refugee. 
2.1.1 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, researcher of public international law including international 
organizations, human rights, and migrants and refugees, is a practicing barrister and a 
professor of International Refugee Law at the University of Oxford. Jane McAdam is 
Scientia Professor of Law at UNSW Australia and focuses the area of international 
refugee law and human rights in her research. In their book The Refugee in International 
Law15, they examine the current status of the fundamental principles in international law 
of non-refoulement, asylum, and the right to seek asylum. Furthermore, the authors 
analyze the framework of international refugee law by focusing on the core issues: 
refugee definition, asylum, and protection. I have used the book as a source of 
information regarding the legal definitions of the different concepts I have examined.  
2.1.2 Benhabib and Nyers 
After examining the three parties’ perceptions of the different concepts, I have 
summarized the results. The summary has given me an overview of their conceptions of 
refugee status and what this entails. To answer the questions posed in 1.1, I have 
compared the theoretical perspectives of Seyla Benhabib and Peter Nyers, presented in 
2.2, to examine how they correlate to the parties’ definitions of refugee and refugee 
rights. By doing so, I have been able to see how and if the status of refugee makes a 
difference in the substantive enjoyment of human rights. Both theorists focus on refugees 
in a human rights context, allowing me to examine the refugee’s position regarding 
human rights in connection to the court case.   
                                                
15 Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. & McAdam, Jane, The refugee in international law, 3. ed., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007 
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2.2 Theory 
2.2.1 Benhabib 
Seyla Benhabib is the Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at 
Yale University. She is known as one of the leading political theorists in the world. In 
The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens16, Benhabib focuses on political 
membership, defined by her as the incorporation of different groups of migrants into 
existing polities. 
 Benhabib argues for a cosmopolitan theory that includes a perspective of just 
membership that “entails: recognizing the moral claim of refugees and asylees to first 
admittance; a regime of porous borders for migrants; an injuction against 
denationalization and the loss of citizenship rights; and the vindication of the rights of 
every human being “to have rights”, that is, to be a legal person, entitled to certain 
inalienable rights, regardless of the status of their political membership.”17  
 The moral claim of first admittance is argued for with the support of Kant’s 
cosmopolitan right theory and his expression “the right of hospitality”. This right is 
founded on the human right to associate, that humans have “by virtue of their common 
possession of the surface of the earth”18. Thus allowing an alien first entry and to 
temporarily occupy a space within a civic entity, other than his own, and not be refused 
access by a state if it results in his destruction. This right is today characterized as the 
principle of non-refoulement in the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees.19  
 Contra Kant, Benhabib argues for an extension of temporary resident to full 
membership. She does not challenge the sovereign state’s right to decide under what 
conditions that membership would be obtained, but stresses the importance of the 
restrictions that human rights create, such as non-discrimination and immigration rights 
to due process.20  
                                                
16 Benhabib, Seyla, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004 
17 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 3 
18 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 27 
19 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, pp. 27-35 
20 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 42 
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 Benhabib proceeds by examining Hanna Arendt’s theory on “the right to have 
rights”. She does so by analyzing the phrase. The first use of “right” is “a moral claim to 
membership and a certain form of treatment compatible with the claim to membership”21. 
The second use of “right” is dependent on that right claim to membership. Benhabib 
suggests that this second “right” creates a three party relationship where the claim of a 
person entitled to the rights, generates an obligation on others and a need for an 
established legal organ, as for example the state and its institutions, that protects and 
enforces the right claim.22 
“The right to have rights” therefore gives everyone, as an entity of humanity, the 
right to be a member of civil society, which in turn grants us the ability to be entitled to 
juridico-civil rights. Now, this right to have rights can only be fulfilled within a political 
community where we are judged by our actions and not by the fortuitousness of birth.23  
Benhabib states, contrary to Arendt’s focus on rights entitlement dependent on 
national membership, i.e. citizenship, that “The right to have rights today means the 
recognition of the universal status of personhood of each and every human being 
independent of their national citizenship.”24. This highlights the paradox of the universal 
human right of seeking asylum, a first step to be included in society, and the right of the 
sovereign state to grant asylum according to its own conditions.25 
Benhabib argues that the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers, even in 
the most rights progressive states, are limited, as they are viewed as somewhat criminal 
and lack the civil and political rights of representation and association. She continues by 
stressing the importance of enhancing the cosmopolitan justice in the world by extending 
the enjoyment of human rights to the full for refugees and asylum seekers and to 
decriminalize their status and their worldwide movement. Furthermore, she states that, 
unfortunately, state interest regulates the right to universal hospitality. Instead of focusing 
on a person’s political status, it is the dignity of moral personhood that should be the 
foundation for the treatment of these individuals.26  
                                                
21 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 56 
22 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, pp. 56-57 
23 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 59 
24 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 68 
25 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 69 
26 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, pp. 168, 177 
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To exercise personal autonomy, Benhabib states that there must be human rights. 
One of the fundamental rights of a moral being is the right to justification. This right is 
significant for the freedom of person, as the restriction of freedom of person must be 
justified as a restriction that is applicable to all, i.e. universally applicable. This in turn 
produces a limitation on sovereign states not to create certain criteria for membership that 
permanently bar people from attaining membership.27  
Benhabib concludes by saying that she argues for “subjecting laws governing 
naturalization to human rights norms”28 and that “those subject to the laws also be their 
authors”29.  
As citizenship, or participation and recognition in a political context, seems to be 
pivotal for the ability to enjoy human rights, I see a problem in the refugee’s ability to 
obtain those rights and enjoy them to the fullest. They have lost the ability to partake and 
be recognized in a political context, but are still subject to the laws of the state they seek 
refuge in. It is therefore questionable if the status of refugee qualifies a person’s claim to 
human rights. 
2.2.2 Nyers 
Peter Nyers is Associate Professor of the Politics of Citizenship and Intercultural 
Relations at McMaster University. His primary interest and area of research relates to the 
social movements of non-status refugees and migrants and how their political claims are 
reforming the norms connected to citizenship and political community. 
 In his book, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond states of emergency30, Nyers points out 
that UNHCR Convention’s definition of refugees31 has had a substantial impact regarding 
the standardization of states’ determination of the qualifications for legal refugee status 
and the accompanying protection that derive from it. He argues that the UNHCR 
Convention’s definition, i.e. a person, fleeing across international borders, that has a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted, is a dualistic structure that presents a tension 
                                                
27 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, pp. 133,135 
28 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 221 
29 Benhabib, The rights of others: aliens, residents, and citizens, p. 221 
30 Nyers, Peter, Rethinking refugees: beyond states of emergency, Routledge, New York, 2006 
31 Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly (1951, 1967) 
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between the human capacity to reason, which relates to the word well-founded, and the 
emotion of fear. This, Nyers means, represents the paradox of humanity in the sense that 
although the concept of humanity is believed to be of a universal character, it works in a 
restrictive manner. This restriction emerges when the UNHCR Convention defines the 
refugee on grounds of the human emotion of fear, because humans defined by their fear 
are also often defined as “social outcasts, lacking full reasoning capacity, and incapable 
of presenting an autonomous, self-governing form of personal subjectivity”32. This fear 
and lack of reasoning results in an idea of the refugee as incapable of verbalizing his or 
her experiences in political terms, thus conjuring the image of the refugee as speechless.33  
 Nyers argues that the refugee’s relationship to the political could be described as 
an “inclusive exclusion”. This means that the refugee is included only on the grounds of 
being something other than the norm of the sovereign state, which in turn excludes them 
for not being a part of the “us” but being a part of the “them”.34 
 This “otherness” paired with “speechlessness” has, historically, established a 
discourse where refugees have been given an animal quality. This challenges the 
refugee’s identity concerning the concept of universal humanity and in extension their 
right to an identity within a political community and the access to political speech.35 
 Nyers points out that the lack of the political identity of citizenship makes the 
refugee a part of humanity, but that this humanity is not a full humanity but a thin one 
that casts the refugee as a speechless and fearful animal. This creates a hierarchy within 
the concept of humanity where someone can be more or less human depending on his or 
her ability to be perceived as a politically articulate entity of society.36 
 I believe that Nyers view of the refugee identity in relation to humanity and the 
sovereign state calls into question the refugee’s ability to enjoy human rights to the 
fullest. If the perception of the qualities of and criteria for refugee status is founded on 
fear and speechlessness, the refugee finds himself or herself outside of politics and is 
treated as less than human, thus excluding him or her from the enjoyment of all human 
rights. 
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3 Analysis of Relevant Concepts 
3.1 The Institution of Asylum and Asylum-seekers 
3.1.1 Legal Definition by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
In the introduction of chapter 7, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, write that asylum is 
referred to in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that the act of giving asylum is 
urged by the UN General Assembly and that the promise of asylum can be found in 
states’ constitutions and law. They do, however, present a problem, which is that the 
actual meaning of the word “asylum” is not defined in either of these authorities. The 
right to asylum implies both the right to a place of refuge, as well as the right to give 
protection to refugees. This suggests that there exists a right for an individual to seek 
asylum. It also indicates an existing sovereign right by state to determine, on grounds of 
its own competence, to exercise its authority over, i.e. give protection to, a foreign 
national in its own territorial jurisdiction. Thus granting asylum to a person, in need of 
protection, defined as a refugee. An important note to keep in mind is that the individual’s 
right to seek asylum does not give the right to be granted asylum, but to have the “claim 
considered on its merits, in combination with the principle of non-refoulement”37. 
Furthermore it should be stated that the receiving state is free to decide what the grant of 
asylum concludes, that means what the refugee has the right to enjoy while being under 
the protection of that state. The conditions could be permanent or temporary residence, or 
the right to work or not.38 
As I have indicated above, the criteria for granting asylum is that the individual is 
defined as a refugee, thus limiting the application of the concept to people in need of 
protection from persecution.  
3.1.2 The Applicants 
The Applicants argue that a formal request for asylum was impossible aboard the ships. 
There were no attempts by national authority to submit them to any form of examination 
relating to their identity or need for protection. The interception was not carried out in 
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accordance to the law and no examination took place, thus denying them to be recognized 
by the law. On their arrival to Libya they clearly expressed a wish not to be handed over 
to the Libyan authority and argue that this was an expression for requesting international 
protection.39  
3.1.3 The Italian Government 
The Government argues that the migrants’ unwillingness to be handed over to Libyan 
authority was not an expression for seeking asylum and protection. If they had done so 
they would have been taken to Italian territory.40 
3.1.4 The European Court of Human Rights 
As to the Italian claim that the migrants had failed to apply for asylum and that their 
refusal to disembark in Libya did not suffice as a claim for protection, the Court observes 
that the Applicants, supported by UNCHR and Human Rights Watch witness statements, 
informed the Italian authorities of their intention to seek protection. The Court contends 
that the Italian authorities have breached the directives given by Article 4, as the migrants 
were not subjected to any form of individual examination of identity, situation or need for 
protection. Furthermore the applicants were not given the opportunity to individually 
oppose the expulsion to qualified authorities. The military personnel of the Italian ships 
were not educated interviewers and no interpreters or legal advisers were present during 
the event. The Applicants were not given information on the destination of the Italian 
ships and were under the impression that they were to be taken to Italy for asylum 
assessment. The lack of information consequently deprived the Applicants of the access 
to effective remedy as well as the opportunity to lodge a complaint with the Italian 
national court in regard to violations of Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol 4.41  
3.1.5 Conclusion 
According to Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, a state is in its full right to grant or refuse 
asylum. Exception to this freedom of choice is related to the refoulement of people with a 
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well-founded fear of persecution, a status that is a criterion for the consideration of an 
asylum grant. Also, as the right to seek asylum is crucial to the concept of asylum, there 
should exist a correlating duty to receive and evaluate asylum applications, but a problem 
arises as this responsibility to process any claims of asylum is not clarified or identified 
in any legal terms or treaties. 
 The Applicants believe that the state failed to exert its obligation that correlates to 
the right to seek asylum, as they were not able to present their circumstances, resulting in 
the denial of that right. In contrast to that, the Government believes that for the duty of 
the state to be triggered there must be a verbalized and precise expression for seeking 
asylum. The Court is of the opinion that the lack of examination, information and 
sufficient means to carry out the duty to receive asylum applications, has resulted in the 
neglect and denial of the right to seek asylum. 
 What is under evaluation here is how important the actual verbalization of the need 
for protection is. Italy tried to circumvent their responsibility to examine the migrants’ 
circumstances by claiming that the migrants never voiced their need, but the neglect 
resulted in a denial of access to due processes, which in extension lead to the risk of 
refoulement. The Government’s argument could be perceived as not only a violation of 
the right to seek asylum, but also an expression of discrimination, as any person that does 
not have the ability to voice their fear and need, be it due to language barriers, 
psychological impairment, or biological reasons, would not be considered as a rights 
claimant.  
3.2 The Principle of Non-Refoulement 
3.2.1 Legal Definition by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
According to Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, the principle of non-refoulement, in its broad 
sense, means that a refugee is not to be returned to any country where there is a risk for 
said refugee to be subjected to persecution or torture.42  
They state that the three concepts refugee status, asylum and non-refoulement, are 
intimately connected, because asylum and non-refoulement are activities of protection 
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directed at refugees. If a refugee presents himself or herself at a border or inside a 
territory of a state, he or she is not entitled to an asylum grant, but is entitled not to be 
returned, or sent, to a country where there might be a risk of endangerment to life or 
freedom. States are bound by treaty not to refoul refugees and therefore have the 
obligation to consider and process asylum application and not refoul before asylum-
seekers are determined to be of refugee status.  This should solve the problem relating to 
the lack of law or treaty definitions of the responsibility to process asylum claims. As the 
principle of non-refoulement relates to refugees, i.e. people in need of protection from 
persecution, it applies to asylum-seekers and there is therefore no need for a formal 
recognition of refugee status for the principle to be applicable.43 
Exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement are few. The state can justify 
expulsion by judging an individual as a threat to the state, society or public order. Usually 
this applies to criminals. Note that the action of refoulement in relation to criminals 
should be in proportion to the crime committed and the expected punishment by the state 
of origin. For example the death penalty usually stops refoulement.44 
It is irrelevant how an asylum-seeker comes within the territory or jurisdiction of 
a state, legal or not. What is relevant is the result of a state’s actions. For example, even if 
the state has the right to refuse disembarkation or the right to tow boats, carrying 
refugees, back to sea, the result could be the return of refugees to a place of persecution, 
in other words it could be an act of refoulement. Furthermore, in the event of a rescue-at-
sea operation of a boat carrying refugees, which states are obliged to carry out, the refusal 
to consider claims to be refugees, would not suffice as a way to circumvent liability for 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement.45 
If a state were to ignore the principle it would be an act of denial of refugee status 
under international law, as the two terms are dependent on each other. Even if the formal 
criterion for the application of non-refoulement is refugee status, general international 
law holds that the principle of refuge equals the protection of persons with a well-
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founded fear of persecution or at risk of being subjected to relevant harm, thus 
encompassing people with no formal status of refugee.46 
3.2.2 The Applicants 
The Applicants argue that they were submitted to arbitrary refoulement. They state that 
the refoulement was a consequence of the lack of opportunity to challenge their return to 
Libya as they were not informed of the return and were under the impression that they 
were to be taken to Italy. The Applicants argue that Libya’s lack of any form of 
protection of refugees exposed them to the risk of being returned to their country of 
origin that they had fled from for fear of human rights violations.47  
3.2.3 The Italian Government 
The Government states that Libya’s ratification of different international human rights 
instruments and the fact that Libya allowed the establishment of a UNHCR office act as a 
guarantee for non-arbitrary expulsion of anyone entitled to the status of refugee and 
asylum. Furthermore, the Government is of the opinion that the bilateral agreement with 
the added provision, posed on Libya by Italy, of compliance with the UN Charter, further 
insured the safety of the migrants.48 
3.3.4 The European Court of Human Rights 
The Court states that the state executing the return of migrants has the obligation to 
guarantee that the intermediary country can ensure that no person will be returned to his 
or her country of origin without undergoing exhaustive assessment of the risks that the 
return would entail. This is particularly important when the intermediary country is not 
committed to the UNHCR Convention. Libya has not ratified the UNHCR Convention 
and has no domestic laws or system regarding asylum and refugee protection. The failure 
of state authority to recognize the refugee status granted by the UNCHR office proves 
that the Applicants’ fear of repatriation was real and well-founded. Information given by 
UNCHR and Human Rights Watch, confirms the insecurity and risk of being exposed to 
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ill-treatment due to arbitrary repatriation. Italy is bound by the Convention to comply 
with the obligations affirmed by Article 3, despite its claim that the migrants failed to ask 
for asylum and describe the risk of being returned to Libya.49  
3.2.5 Conclusion 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam are of the opinion that the principle of non-refoulement is a 
guarantee for asylum seekers and refugees, independent of formal recognition, to have 
access to due process regarding the determination of refugee status. During that time they 
are under the protection of the receiving country and cannot be sent back to their country 
of origin if there is a risk of ill-treatment. 
In regard to the case, the Applicants believe that the denial of the right to seek 
asylum and have that request examined, put them at risk of being returned to a country 
that could send them back to the place that they were fleeing and seeking refuge from. 
Contrary to the Applicants, the Government believes that Libya had the means to carry 
out the duty of receiving and evaluating asylum requests. The risk of refoulement did not 
exist because of Libya’s ratifications and promise to Italy that arose with the signing of 
the bilateral agreement, thus relieving Italy of any obligation relating to the principle of 
non-refoulement. The Court has, on the other hand, come to the conclusion that the 
obligation to the principle of non-refoulement lies with the country that is bound by the 
Convention, whether that implies direct duty to an individual on the state’s territory or an 
extended duty to ensure the protection and safety of migrants being returned to the 
intermediary country. 
What is under discussion here is the safety status of the transit country as well as 
the receiving country’s extended responsibility regarding asylum processes and 
protection against refoulement. What is important to remember is that the ratification of 
different human rights instruments is not sufficient to secure the rights of refugees. It is 
crucial to examine a country’s asylum and refugee protection practices, as this will reveal 
the factual reality regarding the risk of refoulement. At the time of the interception of the 
migrant boats, Libya had no asylum system and it was widely known that refugees were 
at great risk of refoulement. Therefore Italy could not circumvent its responsibility as a 
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receiving state, because the return to Libya could equal the refoulement of the migrants. 
That means that real practice trumps any signatory act in the evaluation of refoulement 
risk and safe third country utilization. 
3.3 Jurisdiction and Territory 
3.3.1 Legal Definition by Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 
The duty, by states, to protect a person fulfilling the criterion for refugee status, no matter 
the formal determination of that status, arrives as soon as that person presents himself or 
herself within a state’s territory or jurisdiction. 
According to Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, a state’s obligation under international 
law extends beyond physical jurisdiction. The obligation of states under the Convention 
extends to include everyone under states’ actual authority and responsibility. This applies 
even if that authority is exercised outside of the states’ territories. This means that a state 
has the responsibility to ensure all persons human rights within its jurisdiction or under 
its authority. In relation to the right to have a claim for asylum examined, the combined 
implementation of the right to leave a country, the right to seek and enjoy asylum, and the 
non-refoulement principle oblige states to give “asylum seekers access to an asylum 
determination procedure”50.51 
3.3.2 The Applicants 
The Applicants argue that they were put under Italian jurisdiction when they were 
transferred onto the Italian ships. They had been under the exclusive control of the Italian 
authorities, thus generating Italy’s obligations in relation to the rights and freedoms 
defined in the Convention and Protocols. They call attention to Article 4 of the Italian 
Navigation Code that declares that Italian jurisdiction is extended outside of state 
territory if a ship is flying the country flag. As above, concerning the concept of asylum, 
the Applicants argue that the interception was not carried out in accordance to the law. 
They were not submitted to an examination by national authority, hence denying them to 
be recognized by the law. Consequently, they were not able to lodge an appeal with the 
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national court. The fact that the interception took place on a ship made it impossible for 
the applicants to be subjected to the legal procedurals provided by Italy upon a possible 
request for asylum. The Applicants also point to a state’s obligation, issued by the 
Convention, ”to guarantee the right to effective remedy before a national court to any 
person falling within its jurisdiction”52.53  
3.3.3 The Italian Government 
The Government argues that although the Applicants were transferred to the Italian 
military ships, Italian authorities have not had ”absolute and exclusive control” as the 
interception was carried out as a rescue operation on the high seas. The rescue of persons 
in distress on the high seas is an obligation established by international law, in 
compliance with Montego Bay Convention and Search and Rescue (SAR), and the 
obligation to rescue did not extend Italy’s jurisdictional obligation and power. The 
Government points out the encouragement from the European Union (EU) for 
cooperation between Mediterranean countries with the purpose to control and fight 
clandestine migration. Therefore the interception and return of migrants to Libya was an 
expression for the bilateral agreement and a cooperation of states, condoned by EU. As 
the event took place on ships it was impossible for the Italian authorities to ensure access 
to a national court. The Government is of the opinion that the Applicants should have 
applied to the national courts, which ”would have enabled any responsibility on the part 
of the military personnel who had rescued the applicants to be established both under 
national and international law”. Furthermore the Applicants that had obtained refugee 
status were free to enter Italy and exercise their right to lodge an application with the 
Italian judiciary.54 
3.3.4 The European Court of Human Rights 
The Court states that all acts of control over an individual on a vessel flying a state’s flag 
is, according to the law of the sea, control exercised within the jurisdiction of that state. 
The principle of extra-territorial jurisdiction is pronounced in Article 4 of the Italian 
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Navigation Code. Italy cannot evade the obligations that arise when migrants enter its 
territory by claiming the intervention was an act of rescue. During the return to Libya, the 
migrants were subject to the ”exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian 
authorities”55. The Court believes that the difficulties that have arisen with the increase of 
migration by sea do not absolve states’ obligations in regard to Article 3 of the 
Convention. Italy, bound by the Convention, cannot evade this by relying on the 
subsequent bilateral agreement with Libya. The Court states that a state executing the 
return of migrants has the obligation to guarantee that the intermediary country can 
ensure that no person will be returned to its country of origin without undergoing 
exhaustive assessment of the risks that return would entail. This is particularly important 
when the intermediary country is not committed to the Convention. Libya has not ratified 
the UNHCR Convention and has no domestic laws or system regarding asylum and 
refugee protection. The failure of state authorities to recognize the refugee status granted 
by the UNCHR office proves that the applicants’ fear of repatriation was real and well-
founded. Information given by UNCHR and Human Rights Watch, confirms the 
insecurity and risk of being exposed to ill-treatment due to arbitrary repatriation. The 
Government is bound by the Convention to comply with the obligations affirmed by 
Article 3, despite its claim that the migrants failed to ask for asylum and describe the risk 
of being returned to Libya.56 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
The legal definition implies that a state exercising its authority outside of its physical 
territory, i.e. state border, is exercising extra-territorial control. Thus generating that 
state’s responsibility and obligations in relation to asylum processes and human rights 
protection. 
 The Applicants’ view of a state’s jurisdiction is that it is not only applicable 
within a state’s territorial borders. It also applies when a state exercises its authority, 
resulting in an expansion of the jurisdictional territory. This means that Italy’s obligations 
as a Convention state were at the time in effect. The Government’s opinion, contrary to 
the Applicants’, is that the interception and return of the migrants were carried out as a 
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rescue in compliance with international law. The act was performed in accordance with 
the bilateral agreement with Libya, an agreement that embodies EU’s wish for 
Mediterranean states’ cooperation in the fight against clandestine migration. With this 
said, the Government believes that the interception, at no point, provoked the obligations 
of a state in relation to state jurisdiction, as the action took place outside Italian territory 
and the Italian authorities did not exercise absolute control over the migrants. The Court 
believes that Italy, both de facto and de jure, exercised control over the migrants as they 
were transferred to the Italian ships and returned to Libya. The rescue perspective and 
influx in migration does not absolve Italy from any obligation that arises within the scope 
of Italian jurisdiction. The conclusion is that the migrants were under Italian jurisdiction. 
Italy had a duty not only to ensure access to asylum processes, but also to guarantee the 
migrants’ safety and prevent any risk of refoulement. Italy failed to do so when returning 
the migrants to a country with a non-existing asylum system, known for its arbitrary 
repatriation of migrants of determined and undetermined refugee status. 
 The discussion is once again focused on the principle of non-refoulement, safe 
(third) country, and asylum processes, but the major focus is on the territorial and 
jurisdictional scope of state authority. The Government’s attempt to circumvent state 
obligation, triggered by authority exertion, gives rise to the question of sovereign power 
versus individual rights. The sovereign power of a state to exercise authority within its 
jurisdiction creates a duty to protect and ensure the rights of its subjects. The duty/right 
correlation that arises from the exercise of authority should come in to effect regardless 
of factual territorial borders, as the exercise of authority acts as a subjection of the 
individual to state jurisdiction. 
3.4 Safe (Third) Country 
3.4.1 Legal Definition by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
A key principal of the UNHCR’s protection policy is the principle of access to a fair and 
efficient procedure in determining the grant of asylum. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
conclude that the return of refugees to a country without a functional asylum system 
therefore equals refoulement. For a state to be able to justify the return of refugees to the 
country of origin or a transit country, i.e. a country that refugees have passed through on 
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their way to the receiving state, the state of return must fulfill four fundamental 
requirements to be seen as a safe country: 
• it must ensure that there is no risk to the life and freedom of the asylum 
applicants, 
• the applicants must have been granted protection, 
• there must exist a promise of no form of torture, and 
• an effective protection from refoulement. 
 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that the ratification of different human rights and 
refugee instruments does not prove a third country as safe, and that it is crucial to 
examine what the state’s actual practice is.57 
3.4.2 The Applicants 
The conditions in Libya, regarding inhuman and degrading treatment of refugees, should 
have been clear to the Italian authorities at the time Italy entered the bilateral agreement 
with Libya. These conditions were validated by the migrants’ testimonies on their release 
from detention. Furthermore, the Applicants point out that Libyan authorities did not 
recognize the refugee status granted by the UNHCR office in Tripoli and that this, in 
addition to Libya’s lack of protection for refugees, exposed them to the danger of being 
refouled to the country they were fleeing for fear of ill-treatment.58 
3.4.3 The Italian Government 
The Government states that the Applicants have not proved that they were subjected to 
inhuman and degrading treatment during detention in Libya, thus nullifying their claim to 
be ”victims”. The fact that most of the migrants eventually were granted refugee status by 
the UNHCR office in Tripoli, proves Libya’s commitment to comply with its obligations 
generated by the Libyan membership of IOM and ratification of ICCPR, UNCAT, and 
the African Union Refugee Convention. The Libyan consent to abide by the UN Charter 
and UNHCR by signing the Friendship Treaty of 2008 (bilateral agreement) proves that 
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Libya at the time of the intervention was to be perceived as a safe country.59  
3.4.4 The European Court of Human Rights 
The Court is of the opinion that at the time of the interception it was well-known that 
Libya had no laws ensuring the protection of migrants and refugees. Libya lacks an 
asylum system and has not ratified the UNHCR Convention. The migrants that were 
granted refugee status by the UNHCR office in Tripoli were not recognized by the 
Libyan authorities and were subjected to ill-treatment and inhuman conditions in 
detention and risked being returned to their country of origin. The Court states that 
sufficient proof has been shown in regard to the Applicants’ real risk of being subjected 
to treatment that is not synonymous to the principle of Article 3 by being returned to 
Libya.60 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
Goodwin-Gill’s and McAdam’s definition of a safe country is a country that has a 
working asylum system, practices refugee protection where there is no risk for ill-
treatment, and in no way violates the principle of non-refoulement. 
The Applicants are of the opinion that the lack of refugee protection and 
recognition of refugee status puts migrants at risk for refoulement and that Libya is not to 
be perceived as a safe country. The Government’s view of a safe country is a country that 
has ratified different human rights instruments and that has allowed the UNHCR to 
establish an office where migrants can apply for asylum and be granted refugee status. In 
the Government’s opinion, there seems to be no state obligation relating to the 
investigation as to the de facto circumstances in the intermediary country. The result is 
that the only prerequisite for a safe country is what is officially stated. The Court believes 
that Libya’s lack of laws regarding refugee protection and the denial of the recognition of 
refugee status results in the risk of migrants being subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment, as well as putting them in danger of refoulement. The actual situation in the 
intermediate country is of vital importance. Consequently the Court’s perception of Libya 
does not correspond with the perception of a safe country. 
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The relevant risk of refoulement in relation to the evaluation of the safety status of 
a safe (third) country is once again the focal point of the discussion. The status of “safe” 
is dependent on a reliable asylum system and the de facto protection practices regarding 
migrants and refugees. 
 
4 Analysis of Refugee Status and Rights 
4.1 Refugee status 
4.1.1 Legal Definition by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
According to Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, the term refugee is a term of art, i.e. a term 
with a specific use or meaning relating to a certain field; in this case general international 
law. They point out the conceptual limitation that states have insisted on drawing for the 
purpose of international law, which restricts the usage of the word, and the obligations 
and responsibilities of states in terms of protection. However, they observe that the 
general usage of the word is broader. Refugee implies a person fleeing from insufferable 
conditions, seeking refuge. The conditions that the refugee is trying to escape can be 
many, for example oppression, persecution, poverty, war, natural disaster etc., but the 
common belief is that, regardless of the grounds for flight, the meaning of the word 
refugee entails the right or worth of the person in question to be assisted and protected 
from the causes for flight. Now, this is where the general definition differs from the 
definition in regard to international law. The cause and reason for flight is used as a 
separator in determining refugee status and is a way to distinguish refugees from ordinary 
aliens. Socio-economic refugees are excluded in terms of state responsibility and asylum, 
as the support has more to do with international aid and development.61 This restriction 
conjures an image of refugees, in connection to international law and treaties, as a group 
in need of aid and protection outside its own country of origin and which is no longer 
under the protection of that country. The definition of refugees is reduced to persons that 
have crossed an international frontier, who can be determined to have a well-founded fear 
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of persecution on specific grounds, i.e. no longer under the protection of the state of 
origin because of persecution or fear of persecution relating to reasons based on “race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.62 
Important to remember is that Goodwin-Gill and McAdam state that the three 
concepts of refugee status, asylum and non-refoulement, are intimately connected. This is 
because asylum and non-refoulement are activities of protection directed at refugees. 
4.1.2 The Applicants 
By producing a summary of the collected information and arguments presented by the 
Applicants, I will show if and how the Applicants, from their perspective, fulfill the 
criteria for refugee status and rights in Italy. Furthermore I will challenge the universality 
of human rights in relation to refugee rights by examining the Applicants’ situation from 
the perspectives of Benhabib and Nyers. 
According to the legal definition presented above, the Applicants have shown that 
they fulfill the criteria regarding flight for fear of persecution and ill-treatment in relation 
to both their country of origin and Libya. They have crossed several international borders 
and situated themselves outside of their country of origin and presented themselves as 
asylum seekers, in need of protection and refuge, within the territory and jurisdiction of 
the Italian state. Furthermore they have proven that the lack of procedures for 
identification has lead to the denial of them being seen as persons recognized by the law, 
which in turn has made it impossible for them to voice their objection for return and right 
to access to legal remedy in front of a national court. In addition they have proven that 
Libya does not fulfill the criteria for safe country status and by doing so shown that they 
were at risk of refoulement by being returned. 
In accordance with Benhabib’s theoretical approach, the Applicants have, by 
leaving their country of origin, made use of the right to leave their state of origin, and by 
presenting themselves at an international border, as asylum seekers, they have made 
claims to the right to associate. This, in turn has generated the Italian state’s obligation, to 
offer entry, an obligation that correlates with the right of hospitality. This right allows the 
Applicants to occupy a part of the surface of the earth, as this surface is a possession 
                                                
62 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, The refugee in international law, p. 37  
 25 
common to all human beings, and not to be refused to do so as it would result in their 
“destruction”. The Italian denial of the right to be seen as persons before the law, has not 
only violated the Applicants’ right to due process, in other words, access to an asylum 
process and a national court, but it has also stripped them of “the right to have rights”. 
Benhabib states that “the right to have rights” gives everyone, as an entity of humanity, 
the right to be a member of society, generating the entitlement to juridico-civil rights. If 
we put this in reverse the loss of legal personhood, that is the loss of juridico-civil rights, 
means the loss of societal membership, thus resulting in the denial of being perceived as 
an entity of humanity.  In conclusion the Applicants loss of legal personhood signifies the 
loss of humanity and the ability to enjoy all human rights. 
 In Nyers’ opinion this would not be the loss of humanity but rather a diluted 
version of humanity. He argues that the status of refugee in itself is a lower form of 
humanhood, as the perception of a refugee is a person in a state of limbo, a state of 
“inclusive exclusion”. The lack of identification would further exacerbate the Applicants’ 
situation. They are part of a hierarchical humanity, where the fear of persecution and lack 
of access to political identity render the Applicants voiceless, a characteristic feature of 
animality, thus refusing them the status of “pure” humanhood and in extension excluding 
them from the full enjoyment of human rights. 
4.1.3 The Italian Government 
The Government’s arguments will show if and how the applicants fulfill the criteria for 
refugee status in Italy and in extension if it generates governmental obligations. 
Furthermore I will show how the Government tries to circumvent state obligation by 
transferring the responsibility on Libya. 
 The Government argues that it has practiced minimal control over the migrants. 
Thus, the territorial state duty to grant protection and access to asylum processes to 
asylum seekers within state jurisdiction was not evoked. The bilateral agreement with 
Libya gives Italy the right to return migrants without identifying the migrants or 
investigate their situation and need for protection, as Libya is perceived as a safe country. 
Furthermore, the Applicants did not voice their need for protection during the return to 
Libya and their unwillingness to disembark in Tripoli was not an expression for seeking 
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asylum. As previously mentioned the Government states that the Applicants have failed 
to prove inhuman and degrading treatment during detention in Libya, thus nullifying their 
claim to be ”victims”. 
According to the Government’s belief, the aggregation of the application of the 
third (safe) country term and dismissal of territorial and jurisdictional responsibility, as 
well as the lack of pronounced protection claim and victimhood by the migrants, 
invalidate the Applicants’ claim to refugee status and rights. With Benhabib’s theory in 
mind, Italy’s refusal of first admittance and temporary stay is therefore not a violation of 
the right to hospitality, because of Libya’s safe country status. The return of the migrants 
does not result in the “destruction” of persons and the Government is of the opinion that 
Libya is able to give the migrants access to the appropriate processes needed for attaining 
refugee status and refuge. 
Italy’s bilateral agreement with Libya is perceived, by Italy, as an active 
instrument used to fight clandestine migration. This shows Italy’s view of migrants, 
approaching the Italian border by boat, as criminals. Italy’s criminalization of migration 
offers a justification for the interception of migrant boats and the return of migrants to 
Libya. In addition to the criminalization perspective the Government claims that the 
interception was a rescue mission, which, in the Government’s opinion reduces the issue 
of authority control and the correlating duty that comes from that act. The idea of the 
migrants as subject to rescue and the return policy to Libya, exonerates Italy from the 
obligation to identify the migrants and evaluate their individual need for protection. 
As mentioned above, the second part of “the right to have rights” creates a three 
party relationship. But if the person doing the claiming is perceived as not being entitled 
to the rights he or she is claiming, the obligation of others is not generated. Furthermore 
there is no need for a legal institution that protects and enforces the right claim. In the 
Government’s opinion, the migrants are not entitled to asylum rights in Italy, therefore 
Italy has no obligation to give access to a legal forum that can handle the right claim. 
Important to remember here is the Government’s view of Libya as a state with an 
adequate protection system for handling asylum seekers and refugees. The result is a 
transfer of state obligation from Italy onto Libya. The lack of identification would 
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therefore not strip the migrants of national and political legitimacy, and in extension their 
status as legal persons, but rather define them as legal persons within a Libyan context. 
According to Oxford Dictionaries online, a victim is defined as “a person who has 
come to feel helpless and passive in the face of misfortune or ill-treatment”63.  The 
helpless and passive nature of a victim could be interpreted as an expression for 
speechlessness. According to Nyers, speechlessness is a quality imposed on the term 
refugee, giving the refugee an animalistic attribute. This attribute conveys a view of 
refugees as less than human, giving them a lower position in a hierarchical humanity. The 
Government argues that the Applicants have not proven their victimhood, which indicates 
that the belief is that the Applicants do not have a well-founded fear of persecution or ill-
treatment. By doing so, the Government has denied the Applicants not only the status of 
victim, but also the “label” refugee. The complexity of the Government’s view of the 
Applicants reaches new heights when taking into account the Government’s argument 
regarding the migrants’ failure to verbalize their need for protection. On one hand, the 
Government denies that the Applicants have a viable claim to victimhood, a term founded 
on characteristics such as helplessness and passiveness. On the other hand, the 
Government denies the migrants the access to refugee rights by arguing that the migrants 
did not actively voice their intention to seek asylum. The conclusion is that the 
Applicants are neither victims, refugees, nor political entities but rather having an 
animalistic quality, i.e. lacking humanhood. 
4.1.4 The European Court of Human Rights 
The Court believes that the Applicants have a sufficient claim to refugee status and rights 
in Italy. Italy exercised de facto and de jure control over the migrants during the 
interception and return to Libya. Consequently, the migrants were subject to Italian 
jurisdiction, extending Italy’s territorial scope and generating the obligation of receiving 
states.  
 Libya’s factual practices and lack of asylum system show that the migrants were 
at risk of being subjected to both ill-treatment and the risk of refoulement, upon the 
                                                
63 Oxford Dictionaries online, definition of victimhood, retrieved 25 May 2013, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/victim?q=victimhood#victim__10 
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return, thus evoking the responsibility of Italy as a Convention state. The Government’s 
argument to disregard the migrants right to appropriate asylum processes, because of the 
bilateral agreement with Libya, the influx in migration and the rescue perspective, is 
therefore not viable. Furthermore, the Court argues that the migrants did in fact voice 
their intention to seek asylum, but that the lack of examination, information and sufficient 
means, further enhanced the migrants inability to claim that right. 
 As shown above, the Court is in agreement with the Applicants, resulting in a 
court ruling in favor of Hirsi Jaama and others. Consequently, the theoretical approach 
corresponds with that of the Applicants. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This essay’s purpose has been to examine the Applicants’, the Government’s, and the 
Court’s definition of refugee and how and if their definitions correlate with human rights. 
The main question I have posed to my material is if the concept refugee is an applicable 
qualification for attaining the status of human rights bearer and/or if the collective belief 
of the status of refugee gives someone the function of human rights holder. 
I have examined the three actors’ definitions of four different concepts: the 
institution of asylum, the principle of non-refoulement, territory and jurisdiction, and safe 
(third) country. In a general sense, the concepts are all important components regarding 
the definition of refugee status and refugee rights. The institution of asylum gives the 
refugee, regardless of status, the right to seek refuge and protection when he or she has 
lost the protection of his or her country of origin. It also generates a state duty to receive 
and examine asylum applications. The principle of non-refoulement, gives the refugee the 
right not to be returned if there is a risk of ill-treatment and destruction of person and a 
state duty not to refoul. Territory and jurisdiction presents what obligations states have in 
regard to asylum applications, non-refoulement, and refugee protection and gives the 
refugee the right to be seen as a person before the law. The term safe (third) country 
works as a tool for states, as it gives the state the ability to decide who has the right to 
refuge within state borders, without accepting asylum applications, because it can refuse 
asylum application and return refugees to transit countries if those countries are deemed 
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as safe. The term also works as a safety net for refugees in certain situations, as the return 
to a safe country must be defined as a return to a country where the refugee will be 
protected from refoulement, as well as given access to due process regarding asylum 
application and protection.  
The analysis of relevant concepts has shown the three parties’ definitions 
regarding the different concepts and how those definitions differ from each other. The 
understanding of the perceived violations put forth by the interception and return of the 
migrants divides the parties into two camps. The Applicants and the Court believe that 
the lack of adequate asylum processes, the neglect of individual identification and the 
assessment of the migrants need for protection violate the right to seek asylum. The 
Government is of the opinion that the migrants failed to voice their intention to seek 
asylum, thus absolving Italy from any duty to provide access to asylum processes. The 
denial of the right to seek asylum put the Applicants at risk of ill-treatment and 
refoulement, a belief shared by both Court and Applicants, as their perception of Libya 
do not correlate with the perception of a safe (third) country. Libya does not have an 
asylum system and is known to disregard the official status of refugee, which has resulted 
in arbitrary refoulement of refugees and asylum seekers. The Government, on the other 
hand, views Libya as a safe country on the grounds of Libya’s ratification of different 
human rights instruments and the establishment of a UNHCR office in Tripoli. The 
territorial and jurisdictional scope of state obligation is dependent on the actual exertion 
of state authority and control. The Government argues that as the interception took place 
outside of Italian territory and that the Italian authorities practiced minimal control over 
the migrants, consequently absolving Italy of any jurisdictional duty. Further, the 
Government claims that the interception was a rescue operation and not an act of state 
authority. The Applicants view the interception, along with the transfer of the migrants to 
Italian military boats, and the return to Libya as an action that placed the migrants within 
Italian territory and jurisdiction. As proof they quoted Italian national law that states that 
vessels flying the Italian flag is Italian territory. The Court agrees with the Applicants and 
points out that the exertion of authority triggered Italy’s duty to ensure access to asylum 
processes in Italy. 
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The summarized result of the parties’ definitions of the different concepts shows 
their view of the Applicants right to seek asylum within Italian territory, and the assessed 
risk of refoulement and ill-treatment, founded on the safety status of Libya. Furthermore, 
it presents the parties assessment of the Applicants’ refugee status. Consequently, the 
Applicants and the Court believe that the Applicants have the right to refugee status in 
Italy, whilst the Government transfers the responsibility of the state, in regard to asylum 
and refugee rights, on to Libya, denying the Applicants the status of refugee in Italy. 
In accordance with Benhabib’s theories that I present in 2.2.1, I have shown, from 
the Applicants’ and the Court’s viewpoint, that the Applicants have claimed the right of 
association, thus generating the receiving state’s obligation to ensure the right to first 
admittance and hospitality, if the violation of this right could amount to the destruction of 
persons. The right of hospitality is founded on the idea that the earth’s surface is a 
common possession to all human beings. Therefore it is every human beings right to 
temporarily occupy a part of that surface. Furthermore, “the right to have rights” should 
ensure everyone as a part of humanity, the right to societal membership, which would 
generate the entitlement to juridico-civil rights. By not identifying the Applicants’ and 
their need for protection, Italy denied them the status of legal personhood, and in 
extension their humanity, resulting in a repudiation of their enjoyment of human rights. 
This loss of humanity is not of importance, according to the theories of Nyers. The image 
of refugees is a passive, voiceless image, more in resemblance of animals than human 
beings. This animality simply produces a more diluted version of humanity, creating a 
hierarchical humanity where refugees are excluded from the full enjoyment of human 
rights. The lack of identification therefore only exacerbated the Applicants’ situation. As 
to the Government’s opinion, the lack of identification is irrelevant because the transfer 
of state obligation onto Libya, viewed as a safe (third) country, absolves the Italian state 
from any responsibility generated by the act of seeking asylum. The Applicants’ failure to 
voice their need for protection and lack of proof for the claiming victimhood, invalidates 
the Applicants’ claim to refugee status in Italy. This linking of two contradictory 
expressions, one demanding a verbalization, the other producing an image of 
speechlessness, renders the Applicants neither refugees, victims or political entities. 
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Consequently, the rights of refugees offer a certain amount of protection and the 
access to some rights. But if the perception of refugees and their rights are to remain 
within a rigid framework, and the denial of their societal and political membership, as 
well as the deprivation of their humanhood, continues, “the right to have rights”, as a 
right of all humans, will be unattainable for them. 
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